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Schwerpunkt 
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Young people’s representations of 
the future and the acceleration of 
time. A generational approach 
Carmen Leccardi 
Abstract 
This paper makes use of a generational approach to deal with the theme of the future and biographical 
projectuality in the epoch of the acceleration of time. Its object is to analyse the strategies, to the extent 
that they exist, through which young people in the new century come to grips with a future that is more 
and more uncertain both economically and socially. Young people today seem to be constructing their 
own time of life in such a way as to keep pace with a society characterised by ever more accelerated 
temporal rhythms – a society capable of pulverising the very idea of the future and of temporal continu-
ity. The paper aims to concentrate on these new modalities, comparing them, in particular, with the rela-
tionship with the future that was constructed by the generation of the baby boomers. For this earlier gen-
eration of young people, in fact, the centrality of intergenerational conflict within a horizon of economic 
expansion was able to give an impulse to the construction of a projectuality that was at one and the same 
time collective and individual. 
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Der vorliegende Beitrag betrachtet mittels eines generationellen Ansatzes das Thema der Zukunft und 
der biographischen Projektierung in der Epoche der Zeitbeschleunigung. Das Ziel ist eine Analyse der 
Strategien der Jugendlichen, sich mit ihren wirtschaftlichen wie gesellschaftlichen Problemen in einer 
immer ungewisseren Zukunft auseinanderzusetzen. Sie bewegen sich in einer immer „situativer“ ange-
legten Zeitkonstruktion; somit können sie sich zustimmend mit einer Gesellschaft in Einklang bringen, 
die durch ein beschleunigtes soziales Tempo gekennzeichnet ist und insofern die Idee der Zukunft sowie 
der zeitlichen Kontinuität zu pulverisieren vermag. Um diesen Prozess näher zu beleuchten, gilt das be-
sondere Augenmerk der Untersuchung den Modalitäten der Zukunftskonstruktionen bei den baby boo-
mers. Bei dieser Generation hat in der Tat der intergenerationelle Konflikt im Rahmen der Wirtschafts-
expansion uneingeschränkte, individuelle und zugleich kollektive Formen von Projektierungsfähigkeit 
angetrieben. 
 
Schlagworte: Zukunft, Generationen, Projektierungsfähigkeit, biographische Konstruktion 
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1 Introduction 
A great many reasons are put forward today to account for the renewed attention that so-
ciology has dedicated over the last few decades to the theme of generations. The most 
common explanation is without doubt the one that points to the intensity of current-day 
demographic changes that are provoking new conflicts between adult and young genera-
tions over the distribution of increasingly scarce economic and social resources (e.g. 
Kohli 1996). No less revealing, however, is the interest in the relationship between gen-
erations and forms of collective identity. In a phase in which the processes of individuali-
sation are becoming more and more intense (e.g. Beck/Beck-Gernsheim 2001), the theme 
of generations offers an assurance of a reading of the social that is particularly attentive to 
the ties between the individual and the collective (e.g. Turner/Eyerman 1999). In the final 
analysis it is possible to argue that it is the strict link between the question of generations 
and the processes of historical-social change that renders the conceptual category in ques-
tion especially stimulating at the present time. 
As is well known, we live in an historical period marked by a rapid acceleration in 
the speed of change, in which the acceleration of time operates as an important strategic 
dimension (e.g. Rosa 2005; Rosa/Scheuerman 2009). As a result social uncertainty is in-
creasing, impacting to a huge extent on social institutions themselves and on their capac-
ity to construct models of action. In these circumstances the succession of the various 
generations – according to a perspective that was opened up by Karl Mannheim (1928/ 
1952) in the first half of last century and whose legacy acts as a backdrop to this paper – 
continues to place at our disposal a useful compass with which to orient ourselves. In 
fact, the symbiosos between the category of generations and the dynamics of change is 
very close: on the one hand, the various generations can be considered to be an effect of 
the processes of change; on the other, they can legitimately be identified as one of their 
causes (e.g. Cavalli 1994). 
If these factors constitute some of the reasons that render the sociological analysis of 
generations particularly fecund at the present time, from the vantage point of a sociologist 
of culture long engaged in the analysis of the condition of youth and the experience of 
time, the attention towards generations and their cultural and political dynamics appears, 
if possible, even more pertinent. Each generation can in fact be considered to be the 
bearer not only of specific visions of the world and history, of highly distinctive cultural 
traits, but also of particular representations of time. 
In this paper we focus on the relationship with the future constructed by two different 
generations1 of young Europeans: on the one hand, the generation of the baby-boomers, 
the so-called “Lucky Generation” of the 1960’s; and, on the other, the generation of the 
new millennium, obliged to come to grips with an on-going climate of economic and so-
cial uncertainty and with a growing acceleration of time. Before dealing directly with this 
relationship, however, it is necessary to make a short digression, taking into consideration 
the theme of temporal acceleration itself and framing it in terms of the co-ordinates of 
contemporary society. 
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2 Social acceleration and the acceleration of time 
Social acceleration is certainly not a phenomenon confined to our times. It is the modern 
age that, according to Koselleck (1979), has been characterised by an acceleration of 
change that erodes experiences, or in other words, by the shortening of the tracts of time 
that allow for homogeneous experience. Already mid-way through the 18th century, be-
fore the spread of the process of the technicisation of communications and information, 
the experience of the acceleration of time was becoming general. Thus, at the beginning 
of the 19th century there was already a widespread sensation that time was “getting away” 
and that what once had gone at a walking pace was now galloping. 
The spectacular technological innovations that took place between the middle of 
the 19th century and the First World War gave life to a new Zeitgeist, profoundly trans-
forming the collective experience of time and space (e.g. Berman 1982). As a conse-
quence of the growing speed in the circulation of goods, people and information and of 
the corresponding reduction in the distance between places – a process that was a func-
tion of the need to increase the speed of the circulation of capital – the rhythm of life 
also became more intense. As Nowotny (1994) has shown, the twofold notion of the 
quantification of time plus acceleration, inserted into an historical horizon constructed 
around the idea of linearity, offered the bases for the capitalistic process of accumula-
tion. 
Although social acceleration, then, is a process that is at least two centuries old, in the 
last few decades it has assumed a strategic centrality in relation to the massive and perva-
sive spread of new information technologies and to the possibilities that these technolo-
gies offer – thanks to their speed – of conquering ever more extensive economic and fi-
nancial spaces. The time of the market, by now planetary in nature (e.g. Laїdi 1999), ba-
sically imposes a further acceleration of that speed that in a defining manner distinguishes 
the modern age from preceding ages. Thus, from this perspective the constitutive charac-
ter of globalisation might be identified in the propulsion towards a global time, a single 
temporal system at whose centre stands the principle of instantaneity. 
Here too, then, is to be found the origin of the ever more intense daily pressure to-
wards the acceptance of everything that “goes faster” (e.g. Gleick 1999)2 – a synonym of 
greater efficiency and competitivity in the market. However, while time-saving is increas-
ing thanks in particular to new technology, at the same time in an apparently contradic-
tory way our sensation of a scarcity of time is also increasing. Out of this paradox arises a 
conception of the “acceleration society” as the form of society within which, according to 
Hartmut Rosa, “technological acceleration and the growing scarcity of temporal re-
sources (i.e. the acceleration in the rhythm of life) take place simultaneously” (Rosa 
2009, p. 87). From this point of view Western societies appear to have become out-and-
out ‘nanocracies’, as it has been proposed, not without a vein of humour, to rename them, 
on the basis of the absolute pre-eminence within them of the dimension of speed – or, 
more exactly, of simultaneity (e.g. Roberts 1998). 
But what are the most important collateral effects of the acceleration of time (e.g. 
Hassan 2009)? Without doubt they include the following: the contraction in temporal 
horizons and the dominion of the “short term”; the out-and-out hegemony of the dead-
line, elaborated as a principle of action; the discrediting of perspectives founded on the 
idea of “once and for all” (i.e. irreversibility); the spread of a culture of the provisory; 
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and the growing difficulty in relating to the future and constructing projects. Let us try 
to consider this last issue more closely, starting from an analysis of biographical time. 
3 Biographical time and the future  
One of the fields in which the legacy of Mannheim has long found extensive expression 
is the study of collective memory from a generational point of view (e.g. Bodnar 1996; 
Schuman/Scott 1989). By contrast, up to today very little attention has been dedicated by 
sociology to the relationship between generations and another dimension of time – that of 
the future. In spite of the fact that what is involved is a theme of significant strategic im-
portance for capturing and analysing the cultural and political representations of a genera-
tion and understanding its action strategies, the issue has long been underestimated by the 
sociology of youth. As we will see shortly, contrary to what seems to be widely assumed, 
the thought on orientations towards the future constitutes a transparent instrument to ana-
lyse youth cultures and generational semantics (e.g. Corsten 1999). As such, it has al-
ready generated an empirically grounded and highly simulating debate principally around 
the question of the presence or otherwise of forms of projectuality among the members of 
the generation of the new millennium (for a summary of this debate see Woodman 2011). 
One useful link between the issue of the future (e.g. Adam/Grove 2007) and that of 
generations is constituted by biographical time. Biographical time can be understood as 
the temporal dimension that emerges as the outcome of the processes through which 
subjects relate to the past, live their own present and enter into relationship with the fu-
ture. Phenomenological sociology, in elaborating its interest in Lebenswelt, has pro-
duced a significant analysis of biographical time. Discussing the relationship between 
time and identity, Luckmann (1993) identifies three complementary and tightly inter-
woven levels of identity: the level of inner time, inseparable from the corporeal dimen-
sion and experienced as durée: the level of intersubjective time, which consists in the 
“vivid present” of face-to-face interactions and the synchronization of flows of con-
sciousness; and the level of biographical time, in which individuals give meaning to 
their life-courses on the basis of interpretative schemes drawn from the stock of knowl-
edge socially available at a particular historical time (of which the dominant temporal 
conceptions are an integral part). 
Let us consider this last dimension in detail. According to Luckmann (1993), bio-
graphical time consists in the interpretative cognitive schemata which people use to 
build a bridge between their life-times and the temporal space lying beyond them. A 
person’s life therefore inheres to a dimension that exists beyond both inner and inter-
subjective time because it is embedded in historical time. Viewed in this light, bio-
graphical schemes – temporal categories internal to the socially available stock of 
knowledge – can be seen as cognitive solutions to the problem of the finiteness of hu-
man life. More generally, they may be interpreted as normative models which enable 
the integration of short-term with long-time temporal sequences of action, and individ-
ual time with institutional times. Through their, and on the basis of the life projects 
whose formulation they provide for, more distant time-horizons are related to everyday 
actions, and vice versa. Moreover, because biographical schemes link individual lives 
with longer social durations, they are instruments of prime importance in constructing 
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an individual’s narratives. Hence they are simultaneously expressions of subjectivity 
and components of the socio-historical world. 
Given the close tie, as is also evident from Luckmann’s observations, between bio-
graphical time and socio-historical time, the mode of conceptualising and of constructing 
biographical time cannot be other than changeable. In other words it tends to change in 
keeping with historical transformations in the ways of representing the relationship be-
tween past, present and future. It is necessary, then, in order to be able to understand 
these dynamics, to carefully examine the new physiognomy that the future has been ac-
quiring over the course of the last few decades, in particular starting from the end of the 
economic boom of the post-World War II period. 
In the latter years of the 20th century the concept of an open future, one of the most 
significant facets of modernity’s new conception of the world (e.g. Erdmann 1964) and 
expression of the Enlightenment model of rationality, entered into a profound crisis. But 
what do we actually mean by this expression? Since the mid – to late – 17th century the 
future has been separate from every form of predestination and free of all reference to the 
past. It has become subject to a human dominion freed from the double influence of the 
divine and the natural. In the European cultural region this new temporal awareness de-
veloped together with a linear concept of time (e.g. Gourevitch 1975). In linear time the 
future is considered as a dimension separate from the present and distinct from the past – 
and, as such, open to control and planning. 
In keeping with the profound optimism of the ideology of progress – an ideology 
which, since the middle of the 18th century has thoroughly permeated the life of the West 
(e.g. Le Goff 1980) – the open, irreversible time of the future proceeded for a consider-
able length of time in the direction of an unquestionable improvement. However, the ab-
sence of references of a transcendental nature and of the belief in the reliability of the 
past gave rise to a new sense of uncertainty, which the planning of the future was called 
upon to oppose. In a functional sense, as Bergmann (1981) emphasises, planning became 
the modern equivalent of the magical practices, oracles and astrology of archaic societies. 
The idea of the possibility of planning the future opened the way for identity in the mod-
ern sense: the life plan became the organising principle of biography (e.g. Berger 1977). 
In the decades following the economic boom after the end of the Second World War 
the uncertainty deriving from the opening-up of the future transformed ever more rapidly 
into a defensive attitude. The expression “crisis of the future” (e.g. Pomian 1980) aptly 
sums up this widespread social malaise. 
A number of elements served to explain this crisis of the future as progressive time 
that could be controlled and planned: the collapse of the ideology of progress; the loss 
of the teleological orientations of history; the expansion of the realm of the possible 
coupled with the feeling of living in an age of widespread threats and risks (e.g. Beck 
2008). In such a situation there was a great diminution in the validity of the formal cal-
culative rationality that lay at the heart of modern society. Where social uncertainty 
grew significantly, it became very problematic to foresee the consequences of one’s 
own actions. As a consequence, the modern individual appeared more and more inca-
pable of making calculations and as a consequence making decisions also became in-
creasingly difficult. And this took place at a moment when, because of the intense 
processes of individualisation at play, a veritable obligation to make decisions in a 
multiplicity of environments, including that of everyday life, entered into biography 
(e.g. Beck/Beck-Gernsheim 2001). 
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Temporal acceleration has certainly contributed to the expansion of this crisis. The 
growth in the speed of social time actually ‘burns up’ the dimension of the future. The fu-
ture folds back into the present, it is absorbed within it and is consumed before it can 
really be conceived. The present becomes “all there is” (Harvey 1990, p. 240). Within the 
temporal frameworks redefined by the compression of time-space the present is the only 
temporal dimension to offer itself as a value, a fully-fledged existential horizon which in-
cludes and substitutes the future and the past. The acceleration of social life and its vari-
ous times renders the future and the past ever more evanescent as reference points for ac-
tion. To put it more precisely: although the evocation of the future continues to constitute 
a routine both for social systems and for subjects, it is in fact the present that is now asso-
ciated with the principle of potential governability and controllability that modernity, 
through its normative ideal of progress, associated with the future. 
4 The 1960s generation: a future of hopes 
In the period that separated the Second World War from the economic boom of the 
1960s, Europe was invested by powerful processes of change (e.g. OECD 1989). In the 
course of these years much of the continent left behind the traumatic experiences of to-
talitarianism and war, the devastation and ruins, the mass unemployment of the immedi-
ate post-war period. Alongside the new-found democratic liberties, however, a large por-
tion of the European population, especially in the countryside, found itself having to 
come to grips with a grim and oppressive poverty. The phase of reconstruction, then, did 
not just open the way to a revival of productivity; it also coincided with the opening-up of 
new individual and collective plans. 
In spite of the acute tension in these years at the international level and the looming 
fear of a new war, the development of industry and the initial spread of a market of dura-
ble consumer goods shifted the gravitational centre of social life towards the future and 
its promise of progress. The economic boom of the 1960s took on the task of rendering 
evident the interaction between a marked economic vitality and a growing social dyna-
mism. The growth in educational opportunities for the young, the spread of mobility, the 
emergence of new mass media like television, which characterised an increasingly urban 
environment, gave rise to a totally novel form of everyday life as well as to new temporal 
horizons. The generation of the baby-boomers was the first “global generation” (e.g. Ed-
munds/Turner 2005) to be comprehensively influenced by these cultural changes. 
In this context, a positive relation was created between the spread of new models of 
consumption, used by young people as instruments with which to emancipate themselves 
from the adult world, symbolic tools vehicled by the world of exchangeable goods, and 
demands for identity: an interaction extraordinarily conducive to the development of 
youth cultures, cultural orientations for the first time independent of the adult world (e.g. 
Heinritz 1985; Zinnecker 1987). Never before had the universe of young people in 
Europe been as united as it was in those years, quite apart from any differences in class, 
by a common urge towards the construction of an autonomous biography, released from 
the constrictions of the ethic of sacrifice characteristic of the preceding generations. 
The construction of new cultures of everyday life (e.g. Highmore 2002), which had as 
its unrivalled protagonist the generation of the 1960s, fed on the growth of the greater de-
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gree of optimism towards the future that characterised the decade in question. This gen-
eration was united by a greater sense of self-confidence, connected in its turn to a greater 
degree of social wellbeing, which protected young people from the major existential dif-
ficulties of life, wrapping them up in a kind of comfortable protective shell. 
In order to understand in greater depth the vision of the future that the 1960s genera-
tion incarnated, it might be useful at this point to turn our attention towards the experi-
ence of the collective movements of the period, characterised – starting out from the 
movement of the late sixties, on which we will focus here – by a new relationship be-
tween politics, personal experience and everyday life (e.g. Touraine 1972). As is well- 
known, not all the members of the generation of the baby boomers were actively involved 
in the collective mobilisations of those years. Nevertheless, the culture and the orientation 
towards the future that guided the more active component left a very deep imprint on the 
entire generation. 
One particular feature strikes one immediately: the temporal horizon in relation to 
which the late sixties movement operated was extremely broad. Within it a distant future 
and past joined up with the present through the concrete forms of mobilisation put into 
action. By way of the struggle against authoritarianism and social inequalities there came 
into being in everyday life new forms of life in common and a much freer form of sexual-
ity emerged (e.g. Herzog 2005). And behind all this lay the conviction that it was possible 
to keep united the various threads that wove together one’s own history with that of the 
collectivity to which one was tied by common horizons and expectations. These were the 
bases of the generational, and political, semantics that the young members of the late six-
ties movement constructed (e.g. Della Porta/Rucht 1995). Within it stood out a future 
free from the capitalist system and the reified social relations that it installed – a vision 
that, one might say, informed the entire culture of the movement in question. 
The personal future and the collective future can in this context be separated only ar-
tificially, and similarly too the biographical project and the collective project. The per-
sonal life project came to be identified with the realisation of the collective project of 
change. The most vital personal energies of the movement’s militants along with the so-
cial and creative resources at their disposal were all deployed on a daily basis to reach 
that objective. 
And it is precisely the omnipresent engagement in politics that turns out to be the 
strategic interpretative key through which to capture the vision of the future that the 
members of the late sixties movement had. Involvement in politics presupposes the desire 
to give direction to change and a vision of the future that embraces the long time of his-
tory. The philosophy of history to which the movement subscribed was capable of operat-
ing only within a long and indefinite temporal horizon (e.g. Cavalli/Leccardi 1996). 
This long-term future, though imagined as better than the present, was nonetheless 
not constructed ‘against’ the present, on the basis of a principle of deferred gratification 
which treated the present simply as a necessary intermediary passage, a medium through 
which to construct what was to follow. Instead, the present and the future found them-
selves aligned along the same trajectory; each one was the interface of the other. The 
“open future” in which the movement operated, it must once again be underlined, was 
considered governable and mouldable thanks to the collective action of and in the pre-
sent. Thus, between the two temporal planes there was no hierarchy; the importance of 
the one did not cancel out but rather enhanced the significance of the other. The present 
was a time of action which prepared the future and at the same time prefigured it here and 
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now. Nothing could be more distant from this temporal orientation than the equivalence 
that is assumed today between the future and uncertainty. 
5 The ‘Millenials’: new strategies to confront an uncertain future 
Helga Nowotny (1994) was one of the first scholars to throw light on the social and cul-
tural background within which the generation of the “Millenials” has taken form. Her in-
terest in the world of science and technology led her as early as the late eighties to focus 
attention on the relationship between the spread of the normative ideal of simultaneity – 
tied to the growing economic centrality of information-intensive technologies – and the 
construction of new representations of time. Her thesis, so far as the question of the future 
is concerned, can be summed up synthetically in three points. First: the transformations in 
the ways of conceiving time need to be understood in the light of the decline of the tem-
poral structure of the industrial age, with its characteristics of linearity and profound faith 
in the ideology of progress. In the phase of industrialisation, the capitalistic logic of pro-
duction, founded on the equation between time and money, rendered time a fundamen-
tally scarce resource. Ever more synonymous with accelerated innovation, today time is 
associated in a structural manner with velocity. Thus, in the life of the collectivity we 
witness an out-and-out “intoxication with speed” (Nowotny 1994, p. 26). Second: in the 
social world the growth in velocity burns up the future in the moment that it is born, 
compressing the temporal space between present and future and rendering it more and 
more tenuous. In this regard, an important role is played by the new temporal models 
produced by the spread of technology: in fact, these models, as well as being bereft of 
linearity, are heavily concentrated on the present. Within their frameworks, causal logic 
cohabits with non-linear, non-causal, holistic processes (e.g. Adam 1992). Third: as a 
consequence of these social and temporal transformations, the idea of a future guided by 
the principle of constant improvement has been replaced by the category of the extended 
present. This category gathers together the traits of openness, controllability and malle-
ability characteristic of the future at the height of modernity. Its ever more extensive 
presence in social life has opened the door to a pluralisation of temporal styles and to the 
construction of a wide range of relationships with time. New temporal experiences, gen-
erated by the spread of the extended present, have taken it upon themselves to come to 
terms with the new “global finiteness of the 21st century” (Nowotny 1988, p. 29). 
The consequences of this representation of time on the biographical constructions of 
young people in the new millennium have inevitably been huge. The social acceleration to 
which the new centrality of the extended present corresponds not only tends to render long-
term projects obsolete but it also modifies the temporal structure of identities. Just like bio-
graphical time, personal identity can in fact be considered as the outcome of the dialectical 
relationship between permanence and change, between continuity and discontinuity, be-
tween past, present and future. Its raw material is by definition existential and social time. 
The temporal transformations which we are witnessing are creating a new “situationalism”, 
which is taking the place of the temporal structuration of identity founded on the long term. 
In this way biographical projectuality is substituted by the choice to deal with situations as 
they arise, taking any necessary decisions not just in keeping with overall needs but also 
with the desires of the particular moment (e.g. Rosa 2009). 
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The construction of biography as a unitary dimension (e.g. Kohli 1985) gives way to 
a biographical narration structured by way of fragments: “biographical episodes” follow 
on from each other, each with its own past, its own present and its own future (e.g. 
Bauman 1995). In the context of the contemporary redefinition of temporal co-ordinates 
it is the very concept of biography that has been put in doubt. In fact, it was modernity 
that furnished a representation of time consonant with a conception of the time of life as 
(auto)biography (e.g. Leitner 1982): an abstract and empty dimension within a temporal 
flow depicted as linear, directed, and irreversible. 
The construction of, and the control over, biographical time, then, has had to come to 
terms with this fragmentation. This new condition can easily generate feelings of tempo-
ral anxiety especially among the young. This anxiety does not only take shape in different 
ways and forms according to the different structural constraints with which young people 
have to come to terms, the characteristics of their family backgrounds and the economic, 
social and cultural resources at their disposal. In addition, the manner of perceiving it is 
variegated, in particular in terms of gender. Research in various European countries – 
from England, to Norway, to Italy (e.g. Brannen/Nilsen 2002; Leccardi 2005a) – has, for 
example, revealed a particular contradiction, to which a considerable number of young 
women are subject. Often they find themselves deprived of the possibility of synchronis-
ing their social clock, ever more accelerated in accordance with the increase in the veloc-
ity of collective rhythms, and their biological clock, anchored to the rhythms of the body. 
In this sense, a biographically central time like that of maternity can be negotiated only 
partially: if and when to become a mother does not constitute a decision that is exclu-
sively dependent on one’s own and one’s partner’s will. Moreover, the age at which the 
decision to become a mother is taken can influence in a very marked way the success of 
the project. In fact, for young women in the new century the awareness of the plural, and 
often incommensurable character of the times of life constitutes a distinguishing trait of 
biographical construction (e.g. Leccardi 2005b). In the relationship between the times of 
the market and the times of private commitments the point of equilibrium is very unstable 
and it needs to be constantly negotiated and renegotiated (e.g. Oechsle/Geissler 2003). 
While this contradiction has a gender-specific character, a further, more general con-
tradiction characterises the generation of the ‘Millenials’: the increasing gap between a 
delayed and non-linear transition to adulthood (e.g. du Bois-Reymond 1998; Chisholm/ 
Hurrelmann 1995; Galland 1997; Pollock 2008; Skelton 2002; van de Velde 2009) and 
the affirmation of a “culture of immediacy”, ever more widespread in all the ambits of so-
cial and institutional life (e.g. Adam/Geißler/Held 1997; Aubert 2003; Baier 2000; Erik-
sen 2001). The temporal orientations of this generation, an important indicator of what 
their representations of the future are (e.g. Anderson et al. 2005; Nilsen 1999; Pais 2003; 
Reiter 2003; Woodman 2011), feed on this imbalance between slowness and velocity. 
A comparative perspective between the two generations considered here can help us 
to focus on the novel aspects of being young at the beginning of the millenium (e.g. Lec-
cardi/Ruspini 2006). So far as the generation of the baby boomers is concerned – the 
point from which we departed – two particularly useful analyses are those of Erikson 
(1968) and Keniston (1968, 1971). In both cases, the postponement of entry into adult-
hood is represented as being the fruit of the equilibrium reached between two types of 
dynamics: on the one hand, individual dynamics, founded on the need to have available 
an additional space for exploring the social world before embracing adult roles; and on 
the other, societal dynamics, tied in the first place to the new levels of economic well-
68  C. Leccardi: Young people’s representations of the future and the acceleration of time 
being in the post-war period, granting legitimacy to a time of experimentation on the part 
of youth. 
This framework has undergone a profound transformation. The exploration by young 
people of the social options at their disposal in the process of becoming adults has come 
into conflict with a horizon that is ever more closed in terms of actually realisable 
choices. The weight of social inequalities is growing, made worse by the new specifically 
“risky” conditions of contemporary Western societies (e.g. Furlong/Cartmel 2007). The 
grave economic crisis of the last few years has rendered even more evident the extent to 
which the social and cultural resources that young people have available to define them-
selves are extremely asymmetrical. The effects of this process are even more onerous in 
that the social imaginary is being reinforced thanks to the joint contribution of old and 
new media (e.g. Appadurai 1996). 
In brief, the social construction of youth has been changing deeply over recent years. 
The models of biographical transition founded on the idea of progressive “steps” in the 
direction of adulthood and on linear schemes are being brought into question. On a gen-
eral level, it is possible to argue that the discussion today should no longer be just about 
the “prolongation of youth” (e.g. Galland 1993), “arrested adulthood” (e.g. Côté 2000), 
“emerging adulthood” (e.g. Arnett 2004) or “yo-yo transitions” (e.g. Walther/Stauber 
2002). In fact, with increasing frequency doubt is being cast on the very possibility that 
the concept of “transition” continues to have sense in contemporary society (e.g. White/ 
Wyn 2008; Cicchelli 2001; Pollock 2002). In this respect, the prevailing structural and 
cultural approaches to the study of becoming adults (“constraint of structures” versus 
“choice biography”; focus on inequality versus individualisation – e.g. Brannen/Nilsen 
2005; Roberts 2010; Woodman 2009) are being challenged. In this problematic context 
the recourse to time as an analytic instrument capable of bringing to contact a range of 
distinct planes – meanings, structures, norms (e.g. Adam 1990) – shows itself to be par-
ticularly fruitful. 
Let us draw to a conclusion, then, this discussion of the generation of the “Millenials” 
by returning to focus attention on the orientations in relation to the future that the young 
people of our time express. Of particular interest is the relationship between these orienta-
tions and the particular semantics of which this generation is the bearer. The principle 
reference point for the discussion that follows is a qualitative study on the transforma-
tions in young people’s experience of time conducted in Milan in the first decade of the 
new century (e.g. Leccardi 2005c, 2009). This research took place twenty years after an-
other study, again of a qualitative nature and again in Milan, on the condition of young 
people looked at from the point of view of the experience of time (e.g. Cavalli 1985; Lec-
cardi 1990). 
According to the results of this recent study young people themselves are for the most 
part to be aware of the fundamental changes that their social age has been invested by; 
they are worried about being able to insert themselves into this scene; but generally they 
are also very capable in negotiating ways of actively managing temporal contradictions. 
Even when young people’s relationship with biographical time calls up little other than 
worry – this is the case for the very numerous set of young people that are confronting 
unemployment or underemployment – they nonetheless try to maintain some form of con-
trol over their own life time. 
Notwithstanding the uncertain and rapid social time in which they are immersed, they 
reflect on and critically examine themselves about the most appropriate temporal behav-
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iours to pursue to “contain the damage”, to avoid a total precarisation of the future. In a 
minority of cases a choice is made to simply take refuge in the present. In others, where 
there is a lack of economic, social and cultural resources to reflectively elaborate their 
predicament, the present can become an out-and-out prison. The majority of young peo-
ple, however, express a conscious relationship with the future – projected or otherwise. In 
other words, they manifest some form of strategy in their relationship with the time to 
come. 
In this respect, two major strategies emerged from the research. The first expresses a 
new tendency that is gaining headway among young people who are better resourced with 
social and cultural capital – comparable from a number of points of view to the trend-
setters discussed by du Bois-Reymond (1998) – and capable of elaborating in a positive 
direction the velocity of the changes and the insecurity characteristic of the current age. 
This strategy (“future without a project”), which is particularly prevalent amongst young 
men, does not involve biographical projects as they are traditionally understood. None-
theless, there remains intact within it the centrality of the time to come. In an uncertain 
and rapid epoch like that of today this control over the future appears to be tied to the ca-
pacity to be ready to change direction if events make it necessary, to suspend decisions or 
to know how to transform them in a rapid way, to the capacity not to allow oneself to be 
pushed off-course by the unforeseen, to stick to the pre-established path notwithstanding 
the presence of adverse external circumstances. In contrast to what occurs with projects, 
changes or unforeseen events do not bring the validity of the approach into question. On 
the contrary, if possible, they reinforce its orientation towards action. In a study on 
French and Spanish young people and time (e.g. Lasen 2001) a similar strategy has been 
brought to light: the “indetermination strategy”. This term is meant to underscore the 
growing capacity of young people with greater social and cultural resources to read the 
uncertainty of the future as a multiplication of virtual possibilities. The unpredictability 
associated with the future is reworked as an additional potential rather than as a limit to 
action. 
The second (“short projects”), which represents the most common position among the 
young people involved in the study – in fact, it extends over a multiplicity of social con-
ditions and characterises the two genders to a similar degree – has at its core the attempt 
to construct forms of control over biographical time through a privileged reference to 
short-term projects. In this case it is the category of the extended present (e.g. Nowotny 
1988, 1994) that constitutes the privileged reference point. Here the reduction of the tem-
poral breadth of projects is the most suitable strategy to face up to the accelerated, unsta-
ble and uncertain social circumstances of our epoch. Engaging in short-term projects – for 
the most part the projects have a temporal extension of a few months, at the most a year; 
rarely does the period in question extend beyond that – becomes a sort of antidote to the 
temporal anxiety associated with the ‘high-speed society’. The anti-anxiety effect of this 
mode of relating with the future can easily be explained. The project in itself acts as a 
barrier against the unknowability of the future; the reference to short or very short spans 
of time (for the most part the period of time necessary to bring to a conclusion the activi-
ties set in motion) guarantees in its turn a relative biographical mastery. 
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6 Concluding remarks 
According to the analytical perspective opened up by Mannheim, the connection between 
the time of history and the time of biography comes about due to the occurrence of moments 
of discontinuity, of rupture, which call into question the traditional forms of intergenera-
tional transmission. As we know, traumatic collective events, typically wars, exemplify this 
eventuality in a very clear manner. But it needs to be underlined that as well as crises impor-
tant moments of discontinuity can also take the form of other events capable of modifying 
common sense and everyday order: not just the participation in social movements but also 
historical developments that are expressed in the form of a conquest of economic well-
being, tendencies towards cultural liberalisation (e.g. Corsten 1999) or the spread of forms 
of social innovation. Through this interaction between history and biography the forms and 
styles of thought change and new cognitive maps and visions of the world come into being. 
Representations of the future are an integral part of these maps and visions. In their turn 
these representations show themselves to be very closely interconnected with the meanings 
that are attributed to being young and to the ways in which young people construct (and 
seek to control) their own biographical time. In this respect, the new normative ideal of si-
multaneity breaks up the constitutive relationship between past, present and future and im-
poses a redefinition of the forms of action in a direction that is ever more “situational”. The 
growth in the speed of life and social time basically tends to be accompanied by the capacity 
to elaborate rapid and flexible responses, something that is incompatible with the idea of 
that medium- to long-term projectuality that modernity associated with becoming an adult. 
For the “Millenials” youth thus no longer seems to constitute a period of fixed dura-
tion characterised by foreseeable and well-delineated passages. Its conclusion is no 
longer constituted by the full entry into adult roles at work and in the family. Instead, to 
an increasing extent it is characterised by a wait for an unpredictable outcome. Both the 
social options available for the definition of choices and action-guidance criteria are un-
clear; the meaning of adulthood itself has lost its self-evidence. As a consequence, the vi-
sion that this generation has of the future, in marked contrast to what was the case for the 
generation of young people which came of age in the late 1960s, is strongly moulded by 
uncertainty and indeterminacy. Because of the current intense economic crisis there is, 
moreover, a fear that one’s own future may be materially worse than that of the genera-
tion of one’s parents. The increasing less rosy expectations in relation to the future tend 
in their turn to give greater scope to that coexistence with the contingent that is the hall-
mark of the high-speed society. 
Notes 
1 As anticipated, the term generation is used here in the sense that Mannheim attributed to it. Accord-
ing to Mannheim (1923/1952), what distinguishes a generation is not simply the fact that its mem-
bers are all of a particular age, i.e. the fact that they have grown up together in the same time pe-
riod. And nor is it the fact that they confront the significant historical events of a given epoch in a 
specific phase of their life course – the phase between adolescence and early adulthood, capable of 
moulding experience and giving birth to common modes of behaviour. To construct a ‘generation as 
actuality’, to adopt the terminology of Mannheim, there must also come into existence a specific 
Generationszusammenhang, a “generational bond” capable of creating forms of common feeling 
towards a given historical context and the currents of thought that manifest themselves within it. 
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2 As far back as two or three decades ago Virilio introduced the term “dromology” to conceptualise 
this process of progressive social and historical acceleration (e.g. Virilio 1997). 
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